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Dr. Walid Phares
Gaza: Big Jihad v. Little Jihad
August 20, 2009
Hamas’ attack against a Jihadist group inside Gaza is about to provide
the Palestinian Islamist organization a pass to become a "mainstream”
movement, acceptable internationally as a partner in negotiations. Or at
least that is what Hamas strategists think may happen as a result of
crushing the minuscule militant entity known as Jund Ansar Allah (The
Soldiers or the Partisans of Allah) last week.
This is another murky development in the world of Jihadism, where the
biggest brothers in holy war devoured the little ones, in a race between
who can achieve final victory against the Kuffar (infidels). But in
Gaza, these intra Jihadist slaughter fests are peculiar in as much as
the "Palestine cause” is so central to the Islamist political narrative
worldwide.
In November of 2008, a new group in Rafah declared itself as the
ultimate Salafi Jihadist force of Palestine. After many previous
attempts by al Qaeda inspired factions at least since 2001, Jund Ansar
Allah (JAA) led by Abel Latif Mussa, aka Abu al Nour al Maqdissi, seized
control of a local Mosque and segments of a neighborhood and launched a
couple attacks against Israel as of early 2009. The JAA issued many
declarations calling for "real Jihad,” ending negotiations with Fatah,
the international community and opposing any type of elections and
constitutional structure in Gaza other than pure Sharia.
From his pulpit, Sheikh Mussa criticized Hamas’ leadership for failing
the Jihad they promised to deliver and for betraying their own
constitution calling for an Islamic Emirate all over Palestine, not just
in Gaza and the West Bank. Hundreds of already indoctrinated youth
joined the JAA and formed the nucleus of a Jihadi milita. Their ranks
were growing at an alarming rate for Hamas, which felt time came to
squash them, before they became a competitive organization. The JAA was
on its way to devouring Hamas from the inside. It was using the same
doctrines upon which Hamas was founded, grew and used to overthrow Fatah
from Gaza.
After a few incidents, Hamas forces overwhelmed the headquarters of JAA
killing dozens of militants. The fighting took its toll on both groups.
Unverified reports said Abu Jibril Shemali, commander of Izzedine al
Qassam Brigades (Hamas’ SS-like force) and Abu Abdallah al Suri, JAA’s
military commander were both killed in the clashes. The founder of the
Jund Ansar Allah Abdel Latif Moussa was killed during the explosion of
one of his suicide bombers as he targeted advancing Hamas fighters. By
now, the "Jund” has been crushed, its Mosque seized and its survivors
pursued. In return JAA underground has threatened to punish Hamas
leadership for their apostasy against "Allah’s true fighters.”
In this is Jihad versus Jihad inside a world of indoctrinated circles of
militants, one circle enjoying power, money and recognition and the
smaller circle wanting to snatch it away from the most powerful. But
what are the lessons we need to learn from this pool of piranhas, where
big Jihadi fish eat little Jihadi fish?
1) According to many commentators on al Jazeera, Hamas chose to finish
up the "Jund” as a maneuver to lure the West in general -- Great Britain
and the United States in particular -- into "engaging” the organization,
lifting its name from terror lists and adding it to the peace process
between the Palestinians and Israel. Hamas spokespersons rushed to use
one term, which resonates greatly in Western ears, especially with the
Obama Administration and the Brown Government, "we too are fighting the
extremists, the terrorists as you are fighting them and pursuing al
Qaeda,” declared Hamas English speaking communicators, hours after the
combat was over.
Analysts in the Arab world, shrewd enough to detect that Hamas tactical
move wasn’t greedy in revealing their game: crushing an "al Qaeda” like
group in Gaza would grant an immediate license to the mainstream for
Hamas. One must expect sympathizing journalists, apologist academics and
soon enough diplomats and envoys citing the "glorious” deeds of Hamas as
evidence of fight "against terrorism.” Some savvier analysts believe
many "engagement” architects in Europe and America have even suggested
such a move to break the veto against Hamas.
Interestingly, the US narrative lately has been underlining that there
is no war against "Global Jihadsim” but only a "war against al Qaeda.”
So those in the business of Jihad, including Hamas, Hezbollah, and a
plethora of other groups, can make their credentials known to the West
by slapping some local, little al Qaeda boys, and claiming a green card
to the world of "accepted Jihadists.” Two summers ago, the Syrian regime
and to an extent, Hezbollah, tried to come up with a similar model:
Damascus released a copycat group in northern Lebanon, Fatah al Islam,
before they claimed they beheaded the organization few months later,
suggesting to Washington that Bashar can also kill al Qaeda crowds.
2) Is there a link between Hamas and the "Jund” it just sacrificed as a
price for its public international image to be enhanced? In classical
Western eyes, these links cannot be seen. But seasoned observers of
Middle Eastern politics and Jihadi tactics can swiftly detect the
equation Hamas-Jihadist factions.
First, the constituents of the "Jund” (JAA) are part of the larger
indoctrinated pools created by Hamas. There are no differences in the
basic doctrine between Hamas and JAA: they are both adepts of Jihadi
Salafism.
Secondly, Hamas tolerated the presence of these ultra-Jihadists in their
midst for a reason, that is as long as their size was small and as long
as they were allowed to grow so that they could be used tactically:
either by blaming them for wild rocket launching or to crush them and
cash in. Comparatively, Hamas couldn’t "tolerate” Fatah for example. By
June 2007 the followers of Mahmoud Abbas were massacred in the enclave,
because they were credible partners in a potential peace process and
real competitors. Ghazi Hamad, a Hamas spokesperson told al Jazeera
English his organization was always dialoguing with the "Jund,” which
means they had a relationship with them even though Hamas was the only
dominant force in Gaza. Hence there was a reason for this "tolerance”
before Hamad admitted that Hamas stopped "tolerating.” Logically, the
Jihadist regime in Gaza fed the little Jihadists and allowed them to
grow until the time of the sacrifice came.
3) This brings us back to review the current Western re-reading of the
so-called War on Terror and the decision by the Obama and Brown
Administrations to let go of the counter Jihadist narrative hoping, as
they said, to drive a wedge between the so-called "good Jihadists” and
the "extremists.”
Hamas quickly understood the message and delivered the goods promptly
hoping they would be reclassified as "good Js.” Not so fast, because
Hamas needs to also cater to its own Gaza indoctrinated constituencies,
which were made to believe for decades that Jihad fi Sabeel Allah
is the only way. Tragicomically, Hamas was trapped by a smart question
fielded by an al Jazeera English anchor who was pressing their
spokesperson to show the difference between Hamas and the JAA:
"Don’t you think that the people you just killed are more faithful to
your constitution calling for the establishment of an Islamic Emirate on
all of Palestine than yourselves, who are in power now?”
Ghazi Hamad rushed to answer by instincts, revealing too much perhaps:
"These guys want to establish the Caliphate immediately on any part
of liberated land, they are irrational; they don’t understand how Jihad
works, we do.”
He said Hamas knows better how to achieve victory.
In my book Future Jihad, I have often argued that the Jihadists
are of several strategic schools of thought: short term, medium term and
long term. The difference between Hamas and the JAA is not about good or
bad Jihad, as experts to Western Governments are claiming. Not at all.
It is a difference about when to trigger the missile, under whose orders
and within which framework of alliances.
The "Jund” wants it all the time, anytime they can. Hamas wants a
perfect kill, coordinated with its allies Hezbollah, Syria’s Baath and
Iran’s Pasdaran. The Jund doesn’t care what the infidels in Washington
and London think. Hamas cares strategically how the allies of its
immediate enemy, Israel, behave. It wants to be part of the widest
regional alliance against the Jewish state, while the latter loses all
its allies, before D-Day is unleashed. |
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