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Dr. Walid Phares
Iran: The Uprising Is On and There’s No Turning Back
June 22, 2009
Why did the Grand Ayatollah Khamenei decide to
suppress demonstrations and not order a
reorganization of new elections to solve the crisis?
What is the analysis inside the Khamanei/Ahmedinijad
"war room”? Based on several assessments, it appears
that the regime feels the protest movement is too
wide and too determined to allow it to expand
further.
The ayatollahs in charge of the "revolution” and the top commanders of
the Revolutionary Guards as well as their financial operatives fear a
popular shift inside Iran’s population along the magnitude of East
Europe’s revolution against Soviet rule. The most cataclysmic parallel
would be with the fall of Romanian communist dictatorship under
Ceausescu. Even a change a la Gorbachev is too dangerous for the elite
that ruled Iran with an iron fist for three decades. Hence, after a
minute calculus, the top mullahs and their militia barons have decided
not to open Pandora’s box to bring reform or democracy to their own
world. And, the world should expect them to use all the power at their
disposal to do away with the demonstrations and its leaders.
But how will the Khomeinist "war room” break up the uprising? What is
their plan?
One would assume that after a thorough review of the real opposing
forces on the ground, and after having secured what they believe is a
solid allegiance by the Pasdaran and Bassij commanders along with
assurances they may have obtained that Iran’s armed forces will remain
distant from the crackdown, the regime will proceed in several
directions:
▪ Put pressure on Mousavi and the leading reformer figures such as
Rafsanjani and Khatemi
▪ Deploying the militias and security forces across the capital and in
other cities
▪ Taking back Tehran block after block while trying to avoid an
international media backlash
▪ Arrest and neutralize student and civil society leaders; and at the
same time, insure that Western Government, particularly the United
States would remain distant from "meddling in Iran’s business.”
So what would be the opposition’s plan? What are the hopes and
projections of Mousavi and his supporters? The former prime minister and
his allies might wish that Khamenei and the supreme Council would find a
better solution which would allow a negotiated solution and a lasting
settlement. He wants to defeat Ahmadinejad but not, no yet anyway, bring
down the regime. However, there is more than one "opposition” group in
the country and the most daring groups have already taken to the streets
to resist the Ayatollahs and bring a real change — not to recount the
votes. Thus, one has to expect a long haul for the opposition.
But is it true that a strong U.S. position in favor of the Iranian
democracy movement would create a backlash against America? The reality
is that those who are advancing this argument are in fact trying to
shield the Iranian regime in the West. The Khomeinist propaganda machine
is unleashing all doubts possible about international support to the
demonstrators. In fact, the tipping point against the ayatollahs’s
militias is precisely a world outcry in defense of the uprising.
Presently there are no neutral Iranians who could be irritated by
American or Western verbal support to democracy in Iran. The argument is
inserted in the debate to confuse the public and mollify outside
solidarity. What can shift the ground against the oppressive Pasdaran is
precisely this, if a wide majority of Iranians feel the international
community is, at least morally, on their side.
The militias will try to suppress the masses, but the latter may take
the struggle to a higher ground and perform strikes that paralyze the
country. In short, this time the Khomeinists won’t have it easily. Too
much power and wealth has disconnected them from their citizens.
Iran’s youth is at the vanguard of huge disenfranchised segments of
society including women, workers, and ethnic minorities. The largest
segments of the population haven’t joined the clash yet. Our bet from
the sociological sample we’ve seen is that when that happens, an
earthquake may occur. The ayatollahs and their extended clientele are
rushing the regime’s army to crush the revolt in the womb. Badly advised
in the past, the U.S. administration is still hesitant to engage with
its real future partner, the people.
But a chain of developments inside Iran may change opinions across the
Potomac. We sincerely hope Washington would catch up with the change
coming from the East, faster. |