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Dr. Walid Phares
Jihadi Pirates on High Seas: What's Behind Them?
April 21, 2009
Most of the
media discussion about piracy in the Gulf of Aden
has drifted understandably towards the sensational
part of the story: how are the Pirates able to roam
the Ocean? Is paying them ransom a better option
than to engage them militarily? Last but not least,
will a military intervention against the Pirates
worsen the situation; will it lead to a massive
escalation in Somalia and a Vietnam like quagmire
for many years to come?
The armed bands on the waters are still roaming the seas of Aden and the
Indian Ocean across from Somalia and Kenya, are not impressed with the
dozens of naval units dispatched by powerful navies from around the
world.
What is behind this Piracy phenomenon, what lays ahead if the
international community intervenes and what could develop in that region
if the latter is late to intervene or doesn’t meet the challenge? It
appears the strategic challenge is even bigger than the mere piracy.
Indeed the strategy now contemplated by regional powers could become a
major military debacle. Here is why:
These so-called Somali pirates are strategically different from their
historical predecessors in the Caribbean or from their contemporary
colleagues in archipelagoes around the world. They aren’t a vast
collection of individual thugs, acting as bands replicating what
successful sea gangs have accomplished for centuries before them. They
are too many, operating from extremely long shores, all using similar
methods, and are backed from hinterland forces. They may seem like
pirates as they seize ships and negotiate for the ransom. But these
water thugs actually belong to a wider chess game. The grand ensemble of
the army of little boats is in fact part of a regional Jihadi apparatus
being deployed in the horn of Africa and beyond. The Jihadi grand circle
building in the region is not limited to the pirates but involves
hostile forces from the mid Red Sea to East Africa. The Somali pirates
are merely one facet of this grand circle.
Ironically, the term used in Arabic (and now in Arabic media) to depict
the Somali pirates is Qursaan, which derives from Corsairs, the
swashbuckling French privateers from a bygone era. A view of the
operations map of these Somali Qursaan leaves little room that the end
aim is to create a vast zone of insecurity stretching from East Africa
to the Red Sea. A closer look allows strategists to easily realize that
these are the maritime passages from the Oil rich Gulf to the
Mediterranean via the Suez Canal and also parts of the East African
alternative routes the most economic via Cape Town. So, above and beyond
the globally low (even if locally lucrative) revenues that these
operations bring to their little pirates, the greater Qursaan operation
is of regional-international dimension. It is about holding these
passages hostages thereby bringing global negotiation. This is nothing
more than a maritime Jihad striking at the Western/international
lifeline on high seas to bring about a change in balance of power.
If the West (with other democracies or powers) decides to engage the
Qursaan on high seas only, there will be more waves of piracy action,
and revenge actions will gradually take place against the countries
whose vessels conducted the military interdictions. When such escalation
takes place the options are only two: either the powers suspend the
operations and negotiate with the pirates/corsairs or they shall take
offensive against their ports of launching, that is, on Somali soil. If
the US and its allies drop the naval campaign and assign diplomats to
treat the matter, the Qursaan will grow in numbers and influence and
eventually their outreach will close the waters between the Arabian
Peninsula and Africa. But if the international coalition (which yet has
to take shape) decides to take on the points of origins of the
attackers, this will lead to a massive campaign along the Somali-Kenyan
coastlines forcing actions to be taken against ports, many small ports
and eventually beachheads, establishing security enclaves.
Such a projection will re-create a multinational force to perform the
missions, reprisal operations and eventually inland deployment, deeper
and deeper inside Somalia. That’s precisely what the Jihadists are
looking for: brigades of international forces landing in that country,
Kuffar (infidels) in nature, so that the Shabab al Jihad
and other remnants of the Mahakam have the honor of fighting.
The so-called pirates are being used by land-based forces to drag the
enemy into a wider war in the region, with all probabilities and
possibilities open. To each decision made by the West and its allies, a
counter plan will be applied. These are the types of complex threats
that twenty-first century terror forces will develop to upset the
balance of forces. For by challenging a previously stable area of
transportation and commerce, the forces behind the Qursaan will be
scoring a major victory. If the foe negotiates, they win, and in their
view also, if the foe engages militarily, the Jihadists win too.
Indeed, if Somalia will go back to full
war, the forces engaged in such campaign will involve many navies in the
area.
Two months ago, Eritrea and the Iranian regime signed an agreement
granting naval facilities to the Khomeinist military ships to use the
country’s ports and eventually build a base on the Red Sea. Last month,
reports signaling an alignment of military intelligence between the
Sudanese and Iranian regimes and Hezbollah’s networks in the region.
In our media debate we are still at the stage of sensationalist stories
and footage of modern day piracy. In the war rooms of the other side,
the Qursaan are probably a tip of an Islamic iceberg moving slowly
towards one of the most sensitive regions of the world. The gap between
our debate and strategic realities has always been at the core of
failures. This time we should catch up before we fall behind and stumble
terribly. |
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