A first quick reading of the site's claim may appear to be an endorsement of the Senator from Arizona. A thorough reading of the posted material in original Arabic, however, and an analysis of the global strategies of the Jihadist movement along with the psychological war efforts by al Qaeda and their allies around the world, tell us a different story and it is the antipode of the Washington Post conclusion.
Here is my reading of the Jihadi postings:
1) Methodologically: When translating and analyzing material posted by al Qaeda or operatives close to the group, or pretending to do so, one has to keep track of the big strategic picture. Al Qaeda doesn't favor one American politician over another; rather it uses images and slogans to derail the global U.S. response to al Qaeda, regardless of who occupies the White House. It doesn't rely on a left wing/right wing parameter.
For example, al Qaeda (and the Iranian regime) attacked Labor Prime Minister Tony Blair because he joined the U.S. in the offensive in Iraq and praised French Conservative President Jacques Chirac for opposing that campaign. The Jihadists accepted support from the U.S. when they were fighting the Soviets and are now in sync with populist Marxists in their fight against America. In short there is a "Jihadi agenda" and what they care about is how to advance it.
2) Strategic goals: The Salafist networks, including al Qaeda, want a defeat of U.S.-led efforts in Iraq and in Afghanistan. The Jihadi war room (part of it is within the top tier of al Qaeda and other parts are connected to ideologues and propagandists situated in various circles in the region and beyond) has a plan for a McCain Administration and another plan for an Obama Administration. It doesn't operate based on the socio-economic agendas of the two candidates but on their assumed national security policies and beliefs.
If McCain is elected, al Qaeda knows that there will be different teams of advisors to wage a different type of campaign. The Jihadists are very knowledgeable about American and European intellectual debates. They also know the thinking process of the counterterrorism teams under Obama. Hence, there is a difference between what al Qaeda's decision-makers and their analysts know, and what their propagandists wish to instill in the U.S. election debate. What they state should be translated and understood only within the greater picture of what they want to achieve. 3) Al Qaeda's propagandists operate within the realm of what the Jihadi machine has created in terms of political culture over the years. The main ideas are that the U.S., under President Bush, tried but failed to destroy al Qaeda; hence, the Jihadist narrative says that any next U.S. President who continues the policies of the Bush Administration will give victory to al Qaeda. Inserting their arguments in the ongoing Presidential debate, this means that the candidate who advances Bush strategies will be better for the goals of Bin Laden. Hence the site's assertion that al Qaeda welcomes a McCain victory (in a sarcastic style).
4) But this tactic used by the Jihadi propagandists is part of a reverse psychology. It aims at sending a message to the American voters: if you want al Qaeda to win, vote for McCain. The Jihadi web sites cannot state it otherwise, such as if you want the U.S. to win, vote for Obama, because in Jihadi war doctrines there cannot be a victory for America, under any President. Hence, what al Qaeda seems to be attempting to achieve is to affect the perception of the undecided voters by stating to them that the strength of McCain in the war on terror is not really strength. Therefore, in the end, the move is aimed at sinking the chances of the former U.S. Navy Pilot by crumbling the support among undecided voters who might ultimately have come to his camp as late as D Day.
5) The savvy Jihadi operatives know all too well that any material they send out in these critical days preceding the U.S. election will be picked up by the media. They also know that any narrative that can be used by the critics of McCain will lessen his chances on November 4, and that is why the stories were run by AP and the Washington Post. If an "enemy" of the United States asserts that it prefers a particular candidate in the White House, al Qaeda may cause the voters to vote for his opponent. Therefore, the web sites’ material might be read in fact as encouragement for U.S. voters to defeat McCain, not the other way around. Experts in Jihadi strategies would then advance the thesis that a McCain Administration is perceived as more dangerous to al Qaeda's long term plans, which would be an additional 4 to 8 years of global efforts against the Islamist movement. This is why their goal is the psychological manipulation of the electorate.
By comparison, in October 2004, Bin Laden intervened directly via a videotape to threaten the states that vote for a Bush reelection, just a few days before the voting. Most probably, the tactics of the Jihadi machine had to evolve and learn from the previous election: if you threaten Americans with retaliation if they vote for the "tough" candidate, the voters will punish al Qaeda. But, four years later, if you welcome the "tough" candidate as a potential failure, the Jihadists may expect that American voters will punish the candidate, this time. If anything, the analysts of al Qaeda may have learned that the American public is resilient and wants success.
6) But would that mean that Bin Laden's organization prefers Senator Obama to be in the White House instead? It is not that simple. Al Qaeda knows all too well that the American public wants a victory over Bin Laden's network. The Jihadists aren't interested in who would save the U.S. economy or create jobs and opportunities in the land of the infidels. What they wish for is a rapid withdrawal from Iraq, a mess across the Afghani-Pakistani border and, above all, a cessation of any war of ideas against their ideology. You have to imagine al Qaeda - or the war room behind it - as cold blooded calculators of the options, not as emotional backers of either one of the candidates.
In 2004, they specifically affected the Spanish elections by blowing up the trains and boosting the opposition's arguments in the media. It worked, as Prime Minister Aznar was ousted. But this didn't mean that they considered his successor, Zapatero, as a good guy. Al Qaeda cells are still plotting inside Spain, and Madrid is still engaged against the Jihadists. The difference is that there are no Spanish troops in the Sunni triangle and there is little U.S.-Spanish cooperation internationally.
7) In the end, the Washington Post investigation is based on unofficial web sites’ postings rather than on an Al Qaeda public announcement which can still happen at anytime. Besides, the article rushed too quickly to a conclusion the Jihadist propagandists wished the American mainstream to conclude. In short, if this was a planned push by the Jihadi Salafi machine (and we don't know yet), it succeeded in triggering a mainstream journalistic reaction about the election debate. When al Qaeda propagandist strikes occur, America must always respond with a unified front. Even at the peak of dizzying exchanges between the candidates, the two campaigns must strike back as one against the Jihadists, even if only one camp is attacked. For the ultimate goal of the terrorists is to defeat the United States, not one particular candidate. |
”
and "
