A detailed map released by a French web site citing Lebanese sources shows the main network of communications established by Hezbollah throughout Lebanon. It details the organization's closed circuit telephone system, a network independent from the one operated by the government.

This parallel network was at the heart of the recent flare-up between Prime Minister Fouad Siniora's cabinet and Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah.

The latter accused the government of attempting to seize the network while the Lebanese government stating that no communication network could operate outside the law. Hezbollah's response was that its status as a "resistance" organization justified it running its own "closed communications system." In other words, to behave as a state within the state.

Under the country's constitution the Lebanese government had the right to demand that Hezbollah shuts down its illegal operation. But no sooner was the ministerial decision made public that Hezbollah launched a blitz campaign on the Lebanese government.

Even though the government was not in a position to dismantle Hezbollah's network or prepared for a militarily confrontation, Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah held a press conference, declared war against the government and gave a signal to the coup.

Why would Hezbollah wage such a risky war for a telecommunication system? Is it because of the income generated by the network to sell international phone calls? Less likely. The Iranian foreign aid to the group was upgraded from $300 million to a little less than $1billion a few months ago.

Obviously more revenue is always welcomed by the leaders of the so-called "resistance," but more important is the big picture revealed by the Hezbollah phone map.

Close analysis of the map tells us the following:

The "Red Lines" stretch from southern Beirut along the coast to the Hezbollah exclusive zones in the south. It covers a complex network of bases in the area, cuts through the Jezzine district and connects with the Bekaa Valley all the way up to northern Lebanon. The most important features and dimensions of the Hizbo-net are the following:

1) The net covers large parts of Greater Beirut: This can provide Hezbollah with the ability to organize its forces in Dahiye (southern suburb of Beirut) for assaults against West Beirut, East Beirut and the Druze Mountain in Aley and the Chouf. The closed circuit can mobilize thousands of fighters without interception from Lebanese or international monitoring. It explains how Hezbollah launched its blitzkrieg offensive on Sunni Beirut, the Druze Mountain and was testing Christian Beirut, without real warning to the areas under attack.

2) The coastal cable-line links the Dahiye to the inner land of the Hezb. It serves to move troops and material from the south to the north without major detection. It explains how thousands of Hezbollah forces were moved from as far as Nabatieh and Tyre to Beirut. But it also tells about the capacity of Hezbollah to use it against UNIFIL forces in the future, if needed.

3) The network between the south and the Bekaa indicates a Hezbollah strategy to close the gap to the east.

As I have indicated in many articles and interviews previously, the Lebanese-Syrian borders are all that count to Hezbollah's terror network. As long as these frontiers are open for Iran to supply weapons and logistics via Syria, the state within the state can thrive and grow.

The Lebanese government and the U.N., with European and U.S. backing, should have closed that gap three years ago, but they didn't. Let's leave the blame game to another discussion. Hezbollah was faster than anyone else.

According to this map the Iranian backed militia built an impressive network throughout east Lebanon from the southern fortresses to the closest position to the northern borders with Syria. This means that Hezbollah by now, has covered the entire Bekaa Valley, and thus has beaten the international community to the borders with Syria.

Military and intelligence analysts can understand this development very clearly. Strategically, Hezbollah is in control of these areas as shown by a map B, which I established two years ago.

4) In the mid-Bekaa, the cable route connects the center of the valley to one of the highest peaks in Mount Lebanon and thrusts into the mostly Christian districts of Byblos and Kesrouan. This shows that Hezbollah has already established an axis of penetration inside the Mount Lebanon area, at few kilometers only from the seashore.

5) Map A also shows that Hezbollah positions are connected to the Anti-Lebanon Range and thus to the Syrian hinterland. Militarily there are no Lebanese-Syrian borders to stop the flow of weapons and forces coming from Iran through Syria into Lebanon.

6) The northern tips of the Hezbollah "cable road" show clearly that its forces are deployed as far north as the eastern slopes of the Cedars Mounts. From these positions, the Iranian-backed forces can seize the highest peak south of Turkey, leap to the Akkar district and reach the northern borders with Syria.

7) More importantly, and because of the strategic bridge between Hezbollah and Iran, this communications network is a battlefield system which can be used by the Iranian Pasdaran and eventually by Syrian Special Forces in a potential mass return to Lebanon.

In summer 2007 I presented a projection-map in a briefing to the Caucus on Counter Terrorism at the U.S. House of Representatives, as well as to a number of high ranking U.S. military personnel. It showed the potential paths of a Hezbollah offensive in Lebanon.

Indeed, strategic projections show that Hezbollah can move its forces from the south toward Beirut (which was executed in May). But it also shows that combined forces of Hezbollah and Pasdaran can move on the Damascus road to Beirut and Mount Lebanon and the center of mountain as well.

Hezbollah-Pasdaran forces would move in the north on an East-West axis and jihadist elements and pro-Syrian forces can move from the borders to Tripoli.

The Hezbollah communication systems shows that when the time will come, massive reinforcements from Syria and Iran can move swiftly along axis already secured by Hezbollah across Lebanon. The invasion of West Beirut and the attacks against the Chouf and Aley districts are only the early signs of what is to come.

8) Last but not least, the Hezbollah communications network can also allow an activation of their massive rocket and missile system across Lebanon without significant interference from Western assets.

The aim of this powerful missile force seems to be against a potential "international" force tasked with the mission of bringing peace to the country. Here again Hezbollah – and Iran – have already beaten the West in the race toward dominating the Eastern Mediterranean.

Dr. Walid Phares is the Director of Future Terrorism Project at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies in Washington, a visiting scholar at the European Foundation for Democracy and the author of the War of Ideas. Dr. Phares was one of the architects of UNSCR 1559. He is also a Professor of Middle East Studies at Florida Atlantic University and a contributing expert to FOX News. Professor Phares’ is the author of two critical books on the Islamofascist threat to Western Civilization, "Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies against the West” and "The War of Ideas: Jihadism Against Democracy."