Mark Silverberg

Revolution in Tunisia: What Next?
January 25, 2011

Poverty alone does not cause revolutions. They are caused by thousands of accumulated injustices that, in their totality, push a society to its breaking point. When that point is reached, even the smallest of incidents can ignite the firestorm. In Tunisia, this appears to have been the case.

What began as the desperate act of a frustrated, humiliated young man in mid-December has electrified the Arab world.

"I am travelling, mother; blame is pointless. I am lost on a road not of our making. Forgive me for disobeying you. Blame the times, not me. I am leaving, and there is no return."

These were the final words written in a short note by Tarek (Mohamed) Bouazizi, an impoverished, young unemployed street vendor from the tiny central Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid who had been denied a local permit to run a small fruit and vegetable stall unless he paid officials "baksheesh" (a bribe). It was his sole source of income. In his despair, he set fire to himself ultimately succumbing to his injuries. His tragic final act of defiance sparked massive demonstrations and rioting throughout the country and eventually brought down the 23-year dictatorship of Tunisian President Ben Ali, on January 14th.

Today, Bouazizi is a hero, and not just to his nation, but to millions of long-abused Arabs in the Maghreb who appear prepared to use the tragedy of his death as a catalyst for change. The Tunisian people had reached a point where even Ben Ali's summary dismissal of his government, his promise of fair legislative elections within six months, and his pledge not to run for a sixth term in 2014 could not save his regime. If it is next to impossible for the educated few to find a job (much less a good job), how much less are the opportunities for the uneducated or those with limited or minimal education?

Tunisia is probably the last Arab country where a popular insurrection could have been predicted primarily because it was the most Europeanized country in North Africa. It is more stable, and Tunisians are generally better educated than most of their Arab brethren. Habib Bourguiba, Tunisia's first post-independence president, made it his business to develop his country's broad middle class by pouring resources into its educational system and making higher education effectively free. He abolished polygamy, established an anti-Islamic fundamentalist regime, and pushed a social agenda of secularization, women's rights, birth control and family planning that, in contrast to most countries in the region, slowed population growth by keeping both public education and social welfare within manageable limits.

Under his successor, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, however, Tunisians became fed up with official corruption and the rapacious lifestyle of Ben Ali's family (colorfully described in recent WikiLeak disclosures); unemployment hovering at 20% (which included an estimated 52% unemployment rate among the country's university graduates); legions of impoverished workers, trade unionists, lawyers and human rights activists; endemic poverty in the rural areas; rising food prices; insufficient investment in the public sector, and one of the most repressive regimes in the region - to which both the EU and the U.S. conveniently turned a blind eye.

When the Tunisian police began wearing red armbands in solidarity with the dissidents, and the army refused to fire on them or to seize power for themselves, choosing instead to surround the Presidential Palace and the airport, Ben Ali knew it was time to pack his bags.

When despots fall, the rest of the club takes notice. His ouster has sparked fear among Arab autocrats that his demise may be the harbinger of things to come given the rising tide of popular dissatisfaction with illiberal, unreformed authoritarian rule in the other Arab autocracies that line the south shore of the Mediterranean. The moment the Arab world learned of events in Tunisia, at least four Algerians set themselves on fire, an Egyptian self-immolated outside the parliament buildings in Cairo, and similar incidents are now being reported in Mauritania, Saudi Arabia and Morocco.

While the near-silence of Arab leaders speaks volumes about their fears, there is little doubt that the region's dictators are praying for chaos and collapse in Tunisia. Gaddafi even told Tunisians they were now suffering bloodshed and lawlessness because they were too hasty in getting rid of Ben Ali. He has good reason to be worried. After all, the Tunisians achieved something unique in the Arab world. For the first time in recent memory, an Arab ruler was toppled not in the name of religion or ideology, nor by the army, or a foreign invasion, or a coup, but by a spontaneous popular uprising of the people over bread-and-butter issues like unemployment, the economy, corruption and the indignities associated with repression.

Until this event, the rulers in the region considered themselves unassailable. Now, the aging Arab dictators of the Maghreb worry that the success of the Tunisians will incite their own impoverished populations to revolt. Probing beneath the surface of the Arab world, one finds an unwritten pact of sorts between those who rule and those who are ruled. Quite simply, if the people are to be excluded from political life and told to forego civil liberties, they must at least be provided with employment, services, economic growth and an improved living standard. This has not happened, and where it has, it has not happened fast enough to keep pace with their burgeoning populations.

The concern in Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Morocco and Algeria has been heightened even further by the knowledge that thousands of messages from ordinary Tunisians supporting the revolution flooded the Internet on Twitter and Facebook by a young generation of Arabs who used their iPhones and blogs to coordinate rallies and protests across their country, took photos of what was happening as it happened, and posted them on Facebook and YouTube.

Statistically speaking, Tunisians have greater access to cell phones and the Internet than do residents of Lebanon, Jordan or Syria (estimates are as high as 30% of Tunisia's population), and this access allowed them to coordinate their activities and disseminate information to the Arab world instantly. For this reason, Ben Ali tried to censor the Internet by blocking political and social media websites. Video-sharing sites were a special target of his censors as Tunisian activists frequently released provocative online videos including one documenting the first lady's frequent shopping trips to Europe using the presidential jet, a beachfront compound decorated with Roman artifacts; ice cream and frozen yogurt flown from St. Tropez, France; a Bangladeshi butler and South African nanny; and a pet tiger in a cage.

As a result, the moment President Ben Ali boarded the plane that carried him into exile, dozens of Egyptian activists began dancing outside the Tunisian Embassy in Cairo, chanting 'Ben Ali, tell Mubarak a plane is waiting for him too!' Audiences in the Arab world were glued to Al Jazeera while Tunisians were filming their own revolution. Grainy cellphone images of clashes with the police in one town led to other clashes. A generation that grew up without a political voice now found one on the web. As a result, the revolt spread like wildfire and became unstoppable.

As Marlyn Tadros writes:

"We all watched Ben Ali's forces clashing with people, saw disturbing YouTube videos of loss of life, watched as Ben Ali's airplane left the tarmac, watched him as his plane was denied landing in Malta and France and its final landing in Saudi Arabia. We all listened to Saudi citizens cursing at their leaders for allowing a tyrant on their land; listened attentively to the White House sheepishly offering a weak statement regarding the right of Tunisians to choose their leader. We saw tweets stating clearly that this was the way to win people's hearts and minds, not through the toppling of a dictator through senseless wars because a real revolution is one that is by the people and for the people rather than a manufactured one."

The implications are ominous. Arab autocrats know that if popular insurrection can succeed in stable, educated and relatively prosperous Tunisia, it can succeed in their own less stable, economically depressed, populous, and politically volatile countries. As Rami Khouri, editor of the Beirut Daily Star noted:

"The grievances that the Tunisian demonstrators articulated are also widely shared across the entire Arab world, with the possible exception of some of the smaller wealthy countries in the Gulf. These complaints are about rising prices and job shortages, but also about the heavy-handed and condescending manner in which ruling Arab elites treat their citizens and deny them the most basic human rights of expression, credible representation, political participation, holding power accountable, and equitable access to the resources of the state and the opportunities of the free market."

Despite a wealth of resources, the Arab states have seen an economic growth rate of only 0.5% a year between 1980 and 2004 (and no better since then), according to the United Nations Development Program, placing them at the bottom of the world's growth list.

Egypt's Hosni Mubarak is serving his fourth term as president, and despite his advanced age of 82 is contemplating running for a fifth term. Egypt, the Arab world's most populous country, has problems that dwarf Tunisia's - the population is booming, 60% are under 30, youth unemployment is soaring, at least 20% of its 80 million citizens live on less than $2 a day, and one third of Egyptians are illiterate – prime indicators of popular discontent. In 2008, a sudden 30% rise in the price of imported wheat provoked widespread bread riots.

Lacking a broad and educated middle class like Tunisia, anxiety over Egypt's future was expressed in a recent article in the Daily Star:

"Anyone expecting a region-wide revolution would do well to look at Egypt, which imports around half of the food eaten by its 79 million population and is struggling with inflation of more than 10%. With a massive security apparatus quick to suppress large street protests and the main opposition Muslim Brotherhood excluded from formal politics, the state's biggest challenge comes from factory strikes in the Nile Delta industrial belt. Egypt's Internet-based campaign for political change, the country's most critical voice, has failed to filter down from the chattering middle classes to the poor on the street……..Strikes have been going on, but not spilling into the public domain. This could however change if rising discontent over food price inflation feeds into the wider malaise about political and economic stagnation and the lack of opportunities and freedom."

The International Monetary Fund has said that with current unemployment rates in the Arab world already very high, the entire region needs to create close to 100 million new jobs by 2020. But in a situation where budgets are being strained by the soaring cost of imported food and fuel, this will be virtually impossible especially in those Arab countries lacking significant oil reserves.

In Algeria, although the middle class failed to join the anti-government rioting in that country and there was no real backing for the riots from Algeria's trade unions (both of which were evidenced in Tunisia), with 25% inflation combined with a 35% unemployment rate, the fear is that Algeria's population may also being edging towards desperation, especially since 75% of those who are unemployed are under 30 years of age. Four days of rioting recently over price rises in food staples like cooking oil, milk and sugar have forced the government to use some of its vast $150B in gas export cash reserves to increase food subsidies, but not all Arab countries are so fortunate.

In Yemen, the poorest Arab state, nearly half the population lives on less than $2 a day and doesn't have access to proper sanitation. Less than 10% of the roads are paved, and tens of thousands have been displaced from their homes by conflict. The government is riddled with corruption, has little control outside the capital, and its main source of income – oil - could run dry within a decade.

Even the Jordanian monarch is concerned. When news of events in Tunisia spread to his country, King Abdullah immediately surrounded his palace with tanks as a precaution. Jordanians held protests in several cities over the rising prices of fuel and food, although Abdullah had earlier slashed some prices and taxes to quell the public anger and ease the burden on the poor. But when faced with events in Tunisia, he imposed a news blackout on the Bedouin riots staged against him in the southern town of Maan, as well as on the rallies held in Irbid, Karak, Salt and Maan by Jordanian University students and Ba'athist party demanding that his Prime Minister, Samir Rifai step down due to declining living standards in the country. All told, more than 5,000 people staged protests across Jordan in "a day of rage" against escalating food prices and unemployment and it all occurred the same day that Ben Ali fled Tunisia.

Even the Palestinian Authority refused to grant permission for a rally to celebrate the overthrow of the Tunisian dictator. While the PA is not as brutal a dictatorship as was Tunisia's, there is no doubt that corruption by unaccountable, unelected officials and torture by PA security forces have raised concerns about the kind of embryonic state President Abbas is building – also with international support.

Failing or failed Arab governance across the arc of countries stretching from Yemen and the Gulf to North Africa is not a new phenomenon. Neither are the remedies difficult to ascertain. These states are collections of tribes and religious communities and they are ruled by tribal regimes that behave according to ancient traditions involving systematic and destructive repression. Patronage, nepotism and bribery continue to be the preferred ways of doing business, as is crushing those who might challenge their regimes.

The backwardness of the Arab world is evident everywhere: in education, health, rising unemployment and pervasive government corruption. The World Bank observed in a recent report that "Arab countries are very vulnerable to fluctuations in international commodity markets because they are heavily dependent on imported food. Arab countries are the largest importers of cereal in the world...and most import at least 50% of the food calories they consume." The problem is that the political leadership across the Arab world lacks the will to reform its economic, political or educational infrastructures primarily because they are well aware that reform has rarely if ever assisted despots in retaining their monopoly on power.

Instead, they continue to use the West's fear of Islamic terrorism as justification for their repression of all opposition, its energy dependence, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to deflect pressures for reforms in their countries. These regimes are not inclined to seek out new export markets, or increase their domestic manufacturing, or enhance their competitiveness through education and labor market reforms. And therein lies their problem and the reason for their fears. Only Lebanon, Morocco, and some of the Gulf States have loosened their political and economic controls sufficiently to bring new entrants into their markets for ideas and enterprise, but they are the exceptions, not the rule.

Whether this "Jasmine Revolution" (as it is being called) survives longer than the "Cedar Revolution" in Lebanon or the "Green Revolution" in Iran remains to be seen. Both were brutally suppressed. Nevertheless, the democratization of Tunisia is a distinct possibility because unlike other Arab countries, Tunisia has a highly educated population. Its annual economic growth rate hovers around 5%; its annual birth rate is only 1.7% (less than Britain); it is mono-ethnic (99% Sunni Arab); its per-capita income is almost twice as high as neighboring Morocco, and ahead of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria; and it is more urbanized (67% of the population) than either Morocco (56%) or Egypt (43%). It also has a high level of tolerance as expressed in the large degree of equality for women. It has banned Muslim headscarves in public buildings and legalized abortions - a deep taboo in most Muslim societies. In addition, the country has strong ties with the European Union, and its economy is closely linked to Europe. Along these same lines, while Morocco sells only15% of its output abroad, and Egypt 24%, Tunisia exports almost 40% of its GDP paralleling most European countries.

These facts make Tunisia unique in the Arab world which leads to the conclusion that while democratization may succeed there, a "democratic domino effect" throughout the rest of the region should not be expected. Anti-Western Salafist movements in Algeria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Libya, and especially Egypt are considerably more powerful and well-entrenched, and could easily assume power in any part of the Islamic Maghreb as these aging dictators and despots depart. What we know is that the Gulf kingdoms that have experimented with more democracy have found anti-Western, Salafi Islamic parties winning seats in their legislative assemblies so these countries may be less inclined to open up their political processes to further democratic reforms.

In addition, many states such as Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen and Algeria maintain vast security forces that are heavily vested in the status quo, and they are unlikely to join the ranks of the dissidents as is happening in Tunisia. In the wake of the Tunisian revolution, popular uprisings against the governments of Yemen and Algeria have already been suppressed by their respective military forces. In Egypt, the military has risen to the government's defense in the past, and most likely would do so again. Arab leaders have little or no tolerance for dissent – Islamic or otherwise. As Barry Rubin of Global Research in International Affairs notes:

"When the going gets tough, the tough don't tremble very long. They take counter-action."

In the end, the success of any revolution is not only dependent upon the sacrifices of the protesters, the magnitude of the protests, or the torments that have propelled them to revolt, but the decision of a regime's security forces either to accept or reject the wishes of the people. As the conflict in Iraq has shown, the abrupt unraveling of dictatorships, even in Tunisia, can unleash forces that cannot always be predicted as was the case in Iran when the Iranian Revolution in 1979 brought Islamic extremists to power. They can also end tragically as was the case in the 1989 protests in Tiananmen Square.

Still, the people of Tunisia have achieved something rare and inspiring as their "liberation caravans" continue to flow unmolested into Tunis demanding democratization, freedom from poverty and better living conditions. It would be a mistake to underestimate the power of the events that have been unleashed. Ideas are the engines of history, and the ideas of "democracy", "freedom" "dignity" and "justice" were the sparks that ignited Tunisian society. If anything, the Tunisian experience proves that a grassroots revolution can happen anywhere for any number of reasons and the Arab Middle East is fertile ground for finding them.

What we do know for certain is that no Arab leader will rest easy these days because of what has transpired in Tunisia. But because they understand very well that these events can ignite their disgruntled populations and end their monopoly on power, do not expect them to go quietly into the night.