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Greg C. Reeson
Taking the Fight to the Pirates
April 17, 2009
The recent pirate attack on the Maersk Alabama off the coast of Somalia
was the first such attack by pirates on a U.S.-flagged ship in more than
200 years. Shortly after the U.S. Navy rescued the ship’s captain,
Richard Phillips, pirates responded by seizing three more vessels and
firing on another U.S.-flagged ship, the Liberty Sun. While the attacks
on U.S. ships are new, the Somali piracy problem has been going on for
at least the last decade. As a result of international inaction over the
years, attacks have now increased to the point where they threaten
international trade and humanitarian assistance to Africa. Ignoring the
pirates is not an option. They will continue their attacks until we
decide to stop reacting and choose instead to go on the offensive to
find a solution to the problem.
Taking the fight to the pirates first requires identifying who they are
and why they do what they do. The pirates attacking cargo and fishing
vessels off the coast of Somalia are not maritime terrorists, as some
have suggested. They have no political purpose and no specific,
predetermined civilian targets. They are, as Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton recently said, common criminals who attack targets of
opportunity with the goal of making a fast buck through ransom payments
or the sale of captured cargo. They are the product of a failed Somali
state, and until the conditions that prompt their actions are addressed,
they will not go away. The problem for the United States, and the
international community, is that no one seems to have the stomach for
another intervention in Somalia.
If no country or group of countries is willing to undertake the massive
nation-building effort that would be required to establish a functioning
state in Somalia, one that would provide non-criminal opportunities for
income and prosperity, then the only solution for the foreseeable future
is strategic management of the piracy problem. Actions taken thus far
have not worked. Patrolling the shipping lane off the Somali coast is an
inefficient and ineffective use of critical naval resources. The area to
be monitored is too vast for the number of ships available for patrols,
and the tactics used by the pirates – moving in fast on small boats and
quickly taking control of targeted ships – minimize the reaction time
available to allied navies. Paying ransoms, which several shipping
companies have done, has rewarded the pirates’ behavior and promoted
additional attacks.
So what can be done? While there is no silver bullet or magic solution
for bringing the piracy under control, there are several courses of
action the United States can take, with or without assistance from other
nations threatened by Somali pirates. To begin, the crews of vessels
transiting the shipping lane off the coast of Somalia can be armed so
that they can defend themselves against pirate attacks. Thus far
shipping companies have balked at this idea because of the increased
risk of harm to crew members and because of legitimate legal concerns.
But relying on reactive naval support from the international community
is not a practical solution, and the arming of crews with sonic cannons,
water guns, and lethal small arms and crew-served weapons remains the
best option for an immediate response to the piracy problem.
A second option is the use of contracted security personnel. This no
doubt would be a controversial course of action, given the allegations
made against private security contractors in Iraq, but shipping
companies could bear the cost of protection for commercial cargo and
receive assistance from the United States, or other participating
nations, for humanitarian shipments sent to Africa by foreign
governments. Another possibility is the use of a convoy system like that
used to escort allied supply ships during World War II. At a minimum,
the United States could maximize the use of its naval forces in the
region by grouping multiple cargo ships together under the protection of
the U.S. Navy. Ideally, other nations would participate in a convoy
system, guaranteeing safe passage for ships involved in international
trade. Those shipping companies declining to participate because of
business worries concerning speed of transport and loss of control and
flexibility would be responsible for their own safety and security.
Finally, the United States and other willing nations could target the
assets and safe havens used by the pirates in the planning and execution
of their attacks. That means hitting the docks where they moor their
boats, destroying their “mother ships” and attack craft, and taking out
the facilities where they live, primarily in the Puntland region and
especially in the “pirate city” of Eyl.
None of
these measures, employed either individually or in concert with other
measures, will completely eliminate the piracy problem. As long as
Somalia remains an ungoverned space, and as long as the international
community remains reluctant to bring that ungoverned space under
control, the conditions that motivate the pirates will continue to
produce armed thugs that seek out weak targets in the waters off the
Somali coast. But the absence of a final resolution to the problem is
not an excuse for continued inaction, especially when the lives of
Americans are at stake. To protect U.S.-flagged ships and American
crews, and to ensure the unimpeded flow of humanitarian aid and
international trade, the United States must take immediate action to
reduce the problem of Somali piracy to a manageable level. |