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Lee Boyland

What the National Intelligence Estimate Does Not Tell You
December 15, 2007

To understand the real message contained in the NEI, it is necessary to understand the basics of nuclear weapons development.

Consider the following analogy based on a hypothetical development of a new synthetic fuel. A research laboratory discovered a new synthetic fuel, which we’ll call Maxifuel. Unfortunately, although it had similarities to gasoline, Maxifuel could not be used in current engines. Driven by geopolitical forces and the rising price of oil, the government decided to develop the new fuel—regardless of cost. To do so required: developing a Maxifuel engine, or engines, and developing Maxifuel production facilities. To head up the Maxifuel Project the government established the New Energy Agency and ordered it to develop Maxifuel engines and production facilities.

Fortunately for the new agency, design of gasoline and diesel fueled engines was established technology, so adapting existing engine designs to use Maxifuel was accomplished in four years. However, designing and
building Maxifuel production facilities turned out to be a major effort, requiring many years. Five years after announcing the formation of the Maxifuel Project, the New Energy Agency announced it had suspended
engine development. The reason—not included in the announcement—was that the engines were ready, but lack of Maxifuel prevented rollout of new vehicles with Maxifuel engines.

By comparison, problems facing Iran’s nuclear weapons developers are analogous to problems facing Maxifuel Project engineers: warhead design is proven, and production of fissile material is established technology. All that remains is for Iran’s production facilities to produce the fissile material needed to fuel its nuclear bombs. Perhaps Iran, like the New Energy Agency’s Maxifuel Project, suspended development of its nuclear warhead program as soon as the warhead design was completed. A scenario not addressed in the NIE.

Building a Maxifuel facility with production capabilities sufficient to meet demand was a long and costly technical effort. Likewise, Iran is similarly engaged in the long term costly effort required to produce enriched uranium, a uranium metal consisting of 3% or greater of the isotope of uranium known as U-235. When uranium is enriched to 90% or greater, it is known both as highly enriched uranium (HEU) and fissile material, one of two metals used to make nuclear bombs.

It’s a known fact that the technology used to produce reactor grade enriched uranium (3-5% U-235) is the same technology used to produce uranium fissile material. Given this knowledge, readers might wonder how the latest NIE could:

A) Conclude with "high confidence” Iran halted its active efforts to develop nuclear weapons in 2003, and that the halt lasted several years;

B) Judge with "moderate confidence” that Iran probably would be technically capable to produce enough HEU for a bomb by 2010-2015; and

C) Also "...assess with ‘moderate confidence’ that Iran probably would use covert facilities—rather than its declared nuclear sites—for the production of HEU for a weapon...” – this despite the NIE’s next statement indicating, "...a growing amount of intelligence (that) indicates Iran was engaged in covert uranium conversion and uranium enrichment activity...” – efforts which they "judge” were, "...probably not restarted
through at least mid-2007.”

In addition, the NIE further muddies the waters by admitting it does not know, "...whether it (Iran) currently intends to develop nuclear weapons,” but it can state with "moderate confidence” that Tehran had not restarted its nuclear weapons program as of mid-2007.

As to the Iran’s present nuclear ambitions, NIE concludes by avowing its "moderate-to-high confidence” that Iran does not currently have a nuclear weapon.

Considering the availability of nuclear bomb making technology, and completing the earlier analogy, it is reasonable to assume that Iran—testing with inert parts—has completed its design and testing of nuclear warheads and has therefore suspended its warhead design. All that emains is production of the fissile material required to make the bomb—uranium-235 and plutonium-239. After all, Iran has continued to develop centrifuge technology and even brags about its 3,000 operating centrifuges at Natanz—that’s what all the hubbub at the UN is about.

To fully understand the NIE report, one must first understand how fissile material is produced: a process that starts at uranium mines where ore is refined and turned into yellow cake, uranium oxide. In Iran, the yellow cake is transported to a facility in Isfahan, where it is converted into uranium hexafluoride (UF6). The Isfahan hex facility – built by the way with Chinese assistance – can produce 200 metric tons of UF6 per year. From the Isfahan facility, the UF6 in solid form is transported in large stainless steel cylinders to a centrifuge separation facility. A large one, with two under ground bays with reinforced concrete roofs, is located 90 feet under ground at Natanz. Each bay can hold 50,000 centrifuges. There may be other hidden centrifuge separation facilities—a fact acknowledged by the NIE.

At the separation facility, the UF6 is heated and turned into a highly corrosive gas, which is fed into the centrifuges. As the UF6 gas passes through each centrifuge, the percentage of the isotope U-235 increases from its initial concentration of 0.07%. When the desired percentage of U-235 is obtained the process stops. In other words, the centrifuge facility can produce 2%, 3%, 5%, 20%, or 90%+ enriched uranium. More centrifuges are required as the percentage increases—or the same centrifuges can be used over and over again.

Iran, a country with insufficient oil refining capacity to meet consumption, claims it wants to develop nuclear power. It is important to understand that the uranium fuel for the reactor can be purchased from several sources at a fraction of the cost of developing an internal uranium enrichment capability.

Yet Iran is spending billions on uranium enrichment facilities—instead of oil refineries.

Highly enriched U-325 can be used to make either a gun-type nuclear warhead similar to the Little Boy dropped on Hiroshima, or an implosion nuclear warhead similar to the Fat Man dropped on Nagasaki. Details of both warhead designs are widely know.

Iran is building, with Russian help, a large light water nuclear power reactor at Bushehr. Russia is also building two heavy water production facilities and an experimental heavy water reactor at Arak. Nuclear reactors produce plutonium-239, the ideal fissile material for implosion nuclear warheads. Chemical separation is required to extract the Pu-239 from the spent fuel.

The heavy water reactor—the ideal type for production of Pu-239 fissile material—will produce enough Pu-239 for two or three nuclear warheads a year.

Implosion nuclear warheads require high energy explosives. Iran has an advanced HMX high explosive production plant in Isfahan.

At present Iran has all the required components of the nuclear fuel cycle necessary to produce a nuclear warhead or warheads. Apparently the NIE does not consider Iran’s commercial uranium enrichment program to be part of its nuclear weapons program—but hedges again by adding it could be (part of the nuclear weapons program) if the decision to do so was made. This logic conveniently allows the NIE to be correct no matter what happens.

The author therefore concludes, with high confidence, the following:

Since uranium enrichment is the key to producing both reactor fuel and fissile material, and Iran has openly continued developing centrifuge uranium enrichment technology, Iran never suspended its nuclear weapons development program.

The real questions should be when and where will Iran’s first nuclear explosion occur?