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Frank Salvato,
Managing Editor
Time to Admit the Realities of Pakistan
February 6, 200 9
For as long as the United States
has been fighting the “War on Terror” the nation of Pakistan has pledged
its alliance. Throughout the tenure of
Pervez Musharraf’s administration and during the prospect of a
Benazir Bhutto government, those in control of the Pakistani message
have openly pledged their support to the US-led effort in the conflict
with radical Islamist aggression. Today, President
Asif Ali Zardari continues that line of rhetoric in the face of an
explosion of radical Islamist influence within his country. But reality
often betrays rhetoric and as we continue in this global, generational
and ideological conflict we in the West would be wise to reevaluate the
actions of Pakistan in the face of their pledges of alliance.
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States
by al Qaeda, the Bush Administration had to make some hard choices with
regard to Middle Eastern and Asian relations, especially where the
initiation of the military retaliation was concerned. Having benefited
strategically from observing the
Soviet-Afghan Conflict of the 1980s, the Bush Administration knew
that defeating the Taliban in
Afghanistan would require a working relationship with
Pakistan if, for no other reason, to secure the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The Bush Administration wisely set out
to avoid the strategic error committed by the Soviets of allowing the
Mujahideen the ability to retreat into the FATA only to reemerge once
the superior Soviet military had receded from their offensive.
Additionally, the Bush Administration understood full well the
difficulty of supplying US military operations in Afghanistan without
the cooperation of the Pakistani government.
As the argument continues on whether or not then Deputy Secretary of
State Richard Armitage actually told then Pakistani President Musharraf
that unless he sided with the United States his country would be “bombed
back to the Stone Age,” one thing is abundantly clear, Pakistan was
not an enthusiastic volunteer in forging the US-Pakistani anti-jihadist
alliance. In fact, as is the status quo for most cooperative measures
between two or more parties in Pakistan, Musharraf had to be financially
enticed to join the United States and the Coalition of the Willing.
After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Pentagon created the
Coalition Support Funds Program (CSFP). This program reimbursed
Coalition partners for their logistical and combat support of US
military operations in the global war on terror. As of May of 2008 the
Government Accountability Office stated that the CSFP has reimbursed
27 Coalition allies for their direct support of US military operations.
Pakistan is the largest recipient of CSFP payments, having received
$5.56 billion (81%) of the $6.88 billion CSFP reimbursements made. It is
estimated that when all aid to Pakistan is totaled (military,
governmental and humanitarian) the amount is in excess of $10 billion.
Speaking to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, then
majority clerk on the Senate Appropriations Committee’s Subcommittee on
State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs,
Tim Rieser said:
“With the possible exception of Iraq reconstruction funds, I’ve never
seen a larger blank check for any country than for the Pakistan CSF
program.”
It can be argued successfully that even in the face of al Qaeda’s
intentional slaughter of over 3,000 innocent Americans, the Pakistani
government required monetary compensation for its alliance.
Troublingly, even as the United States apportioned over $10 billion to
Pakistan, the bulk of which was to finance Pakistan’s engagement in the
war against radical Islamist aggression, the existence of Taliban and al
Qaeda flourished in the FATA while public sympathies for fundamentalist
Islam advanced among the Pakistani people. Evidence to this affect is
provided in the fact that
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and
Ramzi bin al-Shibh were both captured in Pakistan (Rawalpindi and
Karachi, respectively) before their detainment at the Guantanamo Bay
Military Detention Facility in Cuba. Further, credible intelligence from
multiple sources indicate that both Osama bin Laden and Ayman al
Zawahiri – al Qaeda’s number one and two – are currently hiding in the
North-West Frontier Province of the FATA.
It should be noted here that there are elements in the Pakistani
government and the Pakistani military that are engaged in the conflict
against radical Islamist aggression. There are military operations that
do take place along the Pakistani border with the FATA and many
Pakistani soldiers have given their lives fighting Taliban and al Qaeda
forces. That said, the overall commitment of the Pakistani government is
lackluster at best, even as they attempt to
extract additional funding from the United States (unacceptable as
the results have been to date) while imposing increasingly restrictive
caveats on US military action relating to Taliban and al Qaeda forces
fighting in Afghanistan and retreating to the FATA.
Several questions are generated by the status quo in Pakistan, chiefly:
▪ Why the Taliban and al Qaeda have been given almost uncontested
freedom to train, re-group and re-arm in the FATA;
▪ Why the influences of radical Islam have been allowed to actually grow
among Pakistan’s populace;
▪ Is the Pakistani government actually aligned with the United States or
are they manipulating the realities of the conflict with radical
Islamist aggression to their financial benefit.
Pakistan’s Inter-Service
Intelligence Agency
Pakistan’s
Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI) has long been suspected of
playing both sides of the fence where the conflict with radical Islamist
aggression is concerned and rightly so. The organization, charged with
intelligence gathering, counterterrorism operations and the training and
arming of operatives (both officially recognized ISI agents and those
who are members of some of the most tyrannical jihadist organizations),
has significant relations with both the Taliban and al Qaeda stemming
back to the Soviet-Afghan conflict.
During the Soviet-Afghan conflict, the Central Intelligence Agency
relied on the Pakistani ISI to train the fighters of the Mujahideen,
distribute arms to them and channel finances for their efforts.
Throughout, ISI trainers motivated and supported Mujahideen fighters to
fight as a unified force under the guise of “protecting fellow Muslims”
in Soviet occupied Afghanistan. It is estimated that the total number of
Mujahideen trained by the ISI numbered in the 83,000 range.
Just as the United States, Britain and Russia did after Germany’s defeat
in World War II with German scientists and specially trained military
commanders, the Pakistani ISI evaluated its relationships with the
plethora of organizations that comprised the Mujahideen and made a
conscience decision to maintain many of the relationships forged.
Many terrorist operations since the attacks of September 11, 2001,
including the 2008 bombing of the Indian Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan
and the more recent Mumbai massacre have found the ISI being charged as
complicit by the Indian Government. Further, the US has questioned
whether the ISI was leaking top secret intelligence regarding immanent
strikes against Taliban and al Qaeda assets in the FATA to the jihadist
organizations’ leadership. Given the sustained relationships the ISI has
maintained with Taliban and al Qaeda leadership, the question is valid.
The Spread of Radical Islam within Pakistan
The fact that the Taliban and al Qaeda exist without significant
restriction in the FATA serves as but one reason – and a relatively
modern one – that the radical Islamist influence is flourishing in
Pakistan.
In his 2005 Washington Quarterly article,
The Role of Islam in Pakistan’s Future, Husain Haqqani, visiting
scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington,
DC, points out that:
“Radical Islamic groups, which portray themselves as the guardians of
Pakistan’s ideology, have had a special status conferred on them by the
military and civil bureaucracy that normally governs Pakistan...Secular
politicians who seek greater autonomy for Pakistan’s different regions
or demand that religion be kept out of the business of the state have
come under attack from the Islamists for deviating from Pakistan’s
ideology.
“Establishing Islam as the state ideology was a device aimed at defining
a Pakistani identity during the country’s formative years...Pakistan’s
secular elite used Islam as a national rallying cry against perceived
and real threats...This political commitment to an “ideological state”
gradually evolved into a strategic commitment to exporting jihadist
ideology for regional influence.”
Therefore, it is not unusual that institutions such as the
Lal Masjid in Islamabad – or the Red Mosque – would exist. The
Lal Masjid, patronized by many influential members of Pakistan’s
government and military, was influential in recruiting and training the
Mujahideen that fought in the Soviet-Afghan conflict. After the 1998
assassination of its founder, Maulana Muhammad Abdullah (who taught a
radical form of Islam and routinely preached jihad), the Mosque, then
run by his sons, Abdul Aziz and Abdul Rashid Ghazi, dedicated itself to
becoming a center for hard-line
Sunni Deobandi teaching and open opposition to the government.
Mosques and Islamic Centers like-minded to the ideology that thrive at
Lal Masjid, flourish throughout Pakistan even as its elected
officials in government declare their opposition to radical Islam and
jihad.
Radical Islam and jihadist ideology are so prevalent in Pakistan that
directives from al Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan are carried out on
Pakistani soil. The most notable example of this is the
assassination of former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto.
Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, al Qaeda’s commander in Afghanistan circa 2007,
claimed responsibility for the assassination that killed Bhutto and 20
by-standers at a political rally outside Rawalpindi. Al-Yazid described
Bhutto as "the most precious American asset." The al Qaeda-linked group,
Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, a Wahhabi jihadist organization, was officially
blamed for Bhutto’s assassination by the Pakistani government and for
hundreds of additional killings throughout Pakistan. The Bhutto family
and government opposition leaders, including Baitullah Mehsud, leader of
the Pakistani Taliban umbrella group,
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, implicate the complicity of the ISI in
Bhutto’s assassination.
The Pakistani Government’s Loyalty
Recently, Pakistan’s President, Asif Ali Zardari,
called for an increase in US financial aid in order to combat
Pakistan’s ailing economy. He also stressed a need to enhance
intelligence sharing between “the partners in the war on terror.”
Addressing the United States Congress directly during a meeting with
congressional delegates in Islamabad – and, it should be noted, usurping
the formal lines of diplomatic communication through the Executive
Branch (State Department) – Zardari urged the passage of legislation
that would provide increased financial assistance to Pakistan as early
as possible, alluding to a line of rhetoric that has seen little
achievement in the past, saying the assistance would “strengthen
Pakistan's efforts against terrorism.”
In the same meeting Zardari addressed the issue of US drone strikes
inside the FATA. He reiterated his government’s stance that “such
attacks hinder Islamabad's efforts for broader support against terror.”
These statements present additional questions:
▪ Being that the $10 billion already allocated to the Pakistani
government was given in a blank check form sans accountability, what
exactly was the money spent on that Zadari is asking for more?
▪ Given that the Taliban, al Qaeda and myriad jihadist organizations are
more powerful now than before Pakistan received this stipend, what
exactly are Pakistan’s “efforts for broader support against terror?”
▪ Acknowledging the indisputable fact that radical Islamist and jihadist
ideology continues to flourish in Pakistani society, aided by mosques,
madrasahs and Islamic centers, how exactly is Pakistan committed to the
eradication of these virulent and murderous ideologies?
In the end, it can be successfully argued that the US government, by the
specific nature of its financial outlay, resorted to bribery in
attaining its alliance with Pakistan in the execution of military
operations against the Taliban and al Qaeda after the September 11,
2001, attacks. As well intentioned as our elected officials may have
been at the time and as chaotic as the world was in the aftermath of the
attacks, responsibility for this decision must rest with the elected.
As radical Islam prospers not
only in the FATA but in Pakistan proper, and as the Pakistani ISI
maintains its working relationships with jihadi organizations the likes
of the Taliban and al Qaeda, the continued declaration by Pakistan’s
president that his nation remains allied with the United States and the
remaining Coalition of the Willing nations must be questioned in the
most serious of ways. With no progress being made by the Pakistani
government in the fight against radical Islamist ideology and jihad, but
for the occasional arrest of mid-level terrorists, the Obama
Administration must give credence to the reality that the government of
Pakistan is a disingenuous partner in the conflict against radical
Islamist aggression. To continue funding their alleged efforts in the
conflict against radical Islamist aggression is to throw good money
after bad. In this economic climate the United States can ill-afford to
fund jihadi enablers. |